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Abstract
Employment volatility is larger for young and old workers than for the prime
aged. At the same time, in countries with high tax rates, the share of total
hours supplied by young/old workers is lower. These two observations imply a
negative correlation between government size and business cycle volatility. This
paper assesses in a heterogeneous agent OLG model the quantitative importance
of these two facts to account for the empirical relation between government size
and macroeconomic stability.
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1. Introduction1
The motivation for this paper consists of two observations. The first is the2
substantial evidence that countries or regions with large governments display less3
volatile business cycles, as shown in Gal´ı (1994) and Fata´s and Mihov (2001).4
The second observation, documented by Clark and Summers (1981), R´ıos-Rull5
(1996) and Gomme et al. (2005), is that fluctuations in hours of market work6
IWe thank the Associate Editor, Antonella Trigari, and an anonymous referee for their
comments, that greatly improved the paper. We are grateful to Antoine Bozio for kindly
providing us his data, and also to Mauro Bambi, Henrique Basso, Sof´ıa Bauducco, Subir
Chattopadhyay, Antonio Fata´s, Jordi Gal´ı, Juan Pablo Nicolini, Varinia Tromben, as well
as participants at various seminars, for helpful comments. Alexandre Janiak acknowledges
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over the business cycle vary quite dramatically across different demographic7
groups of the population, with the young experiencing much greater volatility8
of employment and total hours worked than the prime-aged. Moreover, in a9
recent paper Jaimovich and Siu (2009) find that changes in the age composition10
of the work-force account for a significant fraction of the variation in cycli-11
cal volatility observed in G7 countries. Hence, this article poses the following12
question: can the relationship between government size and macroeconomic sta-13
bility be explained by changes in the demographic composition of the workforce14
resulting from distortionary taxation?15
The hypothesis we put forward is that large governments stabilize the econ-16
omy because the share of total market hours supplied by young and old workers17
is smaller in countries with high tax rates, implying a lower aggregate labor18
supply elasticity. Thus, in the tax-distorted economy we analyze, a relationship19
emerges between government size (measured by the share of taxes in GDP) and20
aggregate volatility, consistent with the notion of automatic stabilizers.121
The suggestion that time devoted to market work is affected by changes22
in tax and transfer policies has received considerable attention. Recent work23
by Prescott (2004), Rogerson (2008) and Ohanian et al. (2008) argues that these24
changes account for a large share of the difference in the amount of hours spent25
working in Europe and in the US. Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) document that26
the differences in employment rates between Europe and the US are due almost27
exclusively to differences among young and old workers. This observation offers28
further motivation for our paper.29
We examine the strength of automatic stabilizers using a heterogeneous30
agent OLG model along the lines of R´ıos-Rull (1996), and based on the link31
between the tax system and the aggregate labor supply elasticity.2 The model32
includes heterogeneous preferences and, in particular, labor supply elasticities33
that change over the life-cycle. These changes are calibrated to match differ-34
ences in the relative cyclical volatility of employment over the life-cycle and35
differences in employment rates in high and low tax countries.36
To be sure, several factors explain why different age groups experience differ-37
ent labor market fluctuations over the business cycle (Choi et al., 2014). These38
1So-called ‘built-in stabilizers’ are features of the tax structure that make tax liabilities
automatically respond to current economic conditions (for instance, distortionary labor and
capital income taxes) and reduce aggregate volatility. The stabilizing effect of the income
tax is traditionally thought to operate via an assumed sensitivity of consumption demand
to changes in current tax liabilities. But this sensitivity is zero according to the Ricardian
proposition. Thus, Christiano (1984) concludes that under the Ricardian proposition, the
income tax cannot play a role as an automatic stabilizer. Nonetheless, distortionary taxes
may affect macroeconomic stability by affecting the aggregate supply and, in particular, the
aggregate labor supply elasticity.
2To be sure, our paper is not suitable to study the welfare implications of automatic
stabilizers. Optimal taxation must balance distortions versus insurance. But, in our OLG
framework, as in R´ıos-Rull (1996), markets are sequentially complete. Thus, the insurance
gains from automatic stabilizers are negligible. See McKay and Reis (2013) for a detailed
study of the insurance role of automatic stabilizers in an incomplete markets DSGE model.
2
factors are related, for example, to family formation, human capital accumu-39
lation, saving behavior, retirement age and unemployment dynamics, among40
others. We do not model these elements explicitly and, in particular, abstract41
from involuntary unemployment. Clearly, differences in employment volatility42
across demographic groups are partially accounted for by differences in un-43
employment dynamics. But, we interpret the assumed heterogeneity in labor44
supply elasticities as a reduced form way to capture all these factors.45
A related calibration strategy has recently been explored by Dyrda et al.46
(2012) who, for similar reasons, also generate age differences in the volatility of47
hours with differences in preferences. They provide a measurement of the ag-48
gregate labor supply elasticity that, although consistent with micro estimates,49
yields a much higher macro elasticity. In our paper we establish a similar re-50
sult in the context of a large OLG economy. The labor supply elasticity of51
the prime-aged is small, as implied by the meta-analysis of quasi-experimental52
studies by Chetty et al. (2012) but, given the heterogeneity in preferences, the53
aggregate labor supply elasticity of the baseline calibration is equal to 0.84, a54
value recommended by Chetty et al. (2012) to calibrate stand-in agent RBC55
models.356
An important aspect that differentiates this paper from the literature ex-57
amining the stabilizating role of the government sector is that we conduct a58
quantitative study, based on a carefully calibrated model.4 The baseline cali-59
bration accounts for about 75% of the strength of automatic stabilizers. This is60
the result of changes in the workforce demographic composition that affect the61
aggregate labor supply elasticity.62
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents63
the empirical motivation. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 establishes64
three results on the aggregate labor supply elasticity. Section 5 examines the65
quantitative performance of the model. Finally, Section 6 concludes.66
2. Motivating evidence67
The hypothesis we put forward is that large governments are stabilizing68
because they lead the demographic groups with high labor supply volatility to69
work relatively less. Here we document empirical evidence to motivate this70
mechanism. We start by showing that in all OECD countries, employment71
volatility exhibits a u-shaped profile over the life-cycle. The employment share72
3Mennuni (2013) in the context of an OLG model similar to ours, explores the possibility
that changes in the composition of labor affect the evolution of aggregate volatility, but focuses
on differences across gender and schooling.
4Earlier work focuses on the sign of the relationship. Greenwood and Huffman (1991)
and Gal´ı (1994) study if income taxes and government purchases behave as automatic sta-
bilizers in the basic RBC model. Both papers obtain a counterfactual relationship between
government size and macroeconomic stability. Andre´s et al. (2008) extend the analysis in Gal´ı
(1994) and study how models of the business cycle featuring nominal rigidities and costs of
capital adjustment can generate a negative correlation between government size and volatility.
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of the young and old is lower in countries with large governments and these73
difference affect business cycle volatility.74
2.1. The employment volatility profile over the life-cycle75
We begin by documenting the relationship between age and employment76
volatility: the employment volatility of young and old workers is larger than that77
of prime-age workers. Jaimovich and Siu (2009) show that, in the G7, young78
and old workers experience much greater business cycle volatility of employment79
and hours worked than the prime-aged. We show that this empirical regularity80
is found in all OECD countries. To illustrate this fact, we follow the approach81
of Gomme et al. (2005) and Jaimovich and Siu (2009), who report cyclical82
employment volatilities for various age groups.83
We use annual data on employment by age group from the OECD for an84
unbalanced panel of 25 countries from 1970 to 2009, and build seven categories:85
individuals aged between 15 and 19 years old, 20 – 24, 25 – 29, 30 – 39, 4086
– 49, 50 – 59 and 60 – 64 years old. For each of these categories, we extract87
the business cycle component of employment by applying the Hodrick-Prescott88
(HP) filter to the logged series with smoothing parameter equal to 6.25 and we89
calculate the standard deviation. We report the relative volatility, given by the90
standard deviation of each age group relative to the standard deviation of the91
group aged between 40 and 49.92
[Figure 1 about here]93
Figure 1 displays the results for a large cross-section of OECD countries.94
It reveals an ubiquitous u-shaped relationship between age and employment95
volatility at business cycle frequencies. In all the countries, volatility is the96
highest either among workers aged 15 to 19, or those aged 60 to 64. The97
employment volatility of the youngest workers is, on average, nearly five times98
that of workers aged 40 to 49. The workers aged 60 to 64 also display large99
employment volatility, on average more than three times that of workers aged100
40 to 49. Finally, in all the countries the prime-age workers (aged 40 to 49)101
have the most stable labor supply.5102
2.2. Demographic composition of employment and government size103
The second fact we document concerns the relationship between the work-104
force’s demographic structure and government size. We are interested in the105
impact of government size on what Jaimovich and Siu (2009) call the volatile-106
aged employment share (the ratio of employment of individuals aged 15 to 29107
and 60 to 64, to that of individuals aged 15 to 64).108
The first column of Table 1 considers the regression of the volatile-aged109
employment share on government size. Each observation corresponds to an110
5Although our focus is on employment, the cyclical volatility of unemployment also varies
across age groups. For example, Elsby et al. (2010) and Choi et al. (2014) show that the
young were the most affected during the Great Recession.
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OECD country over one of the following periods: 1970 – 1979, 1980 – 1989,111
1990 – 1999 and 2000 – 2009. The regression reveals a negative and precisely112
estimated coefficient.113
[Table 1 about here]114
Of course, countries with older populations may need large governments.115
For example, large governments help provide the old with social security and116
healthcare. At the same time, countries with an older population have a lower117
share of young workers in aggregate employment. Thus, the negative correlation118
between the government size and the volatile-aged employment share could be119
spurious and due to the varying share of old individuals.6 To confront this issue,120
the second column in Table 1 controls for the share of individuals aged 60 or more121
in the population. The results confirm that countries with older populations122
have lower volatile-aged employment shares. This implies a weaker independent123
influence of government size, but still strongly significant. Columns (3) and (4)124
report the same regressions as in columns (1) and (2), excluding individuals125
aged 60 to 64 from the volatile-aged employment share. The estimates are very126
similar.127
2.3. Government size and business cycle volatility: role of demographics128
Next, we argue that as a result of the negative correlation between the129
volatile-aged share of employment and government size, business cycles are less130
volatile in countries with large governments. Column (1) of Table 2 reports131
the regression of the volatility of aggregate hours on the volatile-aged share132
of employment. The coefficient is positive and precisely estimated. In turn,133
countries with larger governments enjoy more stable aggregate hours, as shown134
in column (2) of Table 2. However, the latter relationship vanishes if we control135
for the volatile-aged share of employment, as illustrated in column (3) of Table 2.136
The coefficient falls by 52% and is no longer significant. This suggests that137
government size affects the volatility of aggregate hours by changing the volatile-138
aged share of employment.139
[Table 2 about here]140
Turning to the volatility of GDP, column (4) of Table 2 shows that higher141
volatility of aggregate hours implies higher output volatility. Finally, columns142
(5) to (6) consider the same regressions as in columns (2) to (3), but with the143
volatility of GDP as the dependent variable, with similar results.144
2.4. The intensive margin of adjustment145
The evidence discussed so far is about how taxes affect the demographic com-146
position of employment and how this affects aggregate volatility. But, variation147
in hours worked in the intensive margin (hours worked by those in employment)148
6We thank a referee for this comment.
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was ignored. This component is quantitatively unimportant for the fluctuation149
of hours worked in the case of the US where most of the variation in total hours150
is on the extensive margin (Hansen, 1985), but it is more important in more151
regulated economies such as France (Ohanian and Raffo, 2012).7 In Appendix152
H we show that there is a negative correlation between government size and the153
relative hours worked by employed young workers, but that the intensive margin154
contribution to explain the negative correlation between government size and155
macroeconomic volatility is small.8156
2.5. Summary of the empirical evidence157
This Section documented the four following facts: i) the employment of158
young/old individuals fluctuates much more over the business cycle than that159
of prime-age individuals; ii) across OECD countries, the volatile-aged share of160
employment declines as the size of the government increases, even after con-161
trolling for the population’s demographic structure; iii) there exists a negative162
link between government size and the cyclical volatility of aggregate hours and163
output, however, controlling for the demographic composition of the workforce164
attenuates substantially this relationship; iv) this mechanism operates along165
the extensive margin. Next, we propose a heterogeneous agent OLG model166
motivated by these four facts.167
3. The model168
We present a model with life-cycle changes in the cyclical volatility of hours169
worked. The framework is that of an OLG economy as in R´ıos-Rull (1996), and170
we model labor supply in the extensive margin by way of a non-linear production171
function of labor services, as in Prescott et al. (2009). Time is discrete and each172
date t corresponds to a year. Each year a continuum (measure µ1) of individuals173
is born. We denote an individual’s age by i = 1, . . . , T . Individuals live at most174
T = 70 periods, but face random lifespans. The conditional probability of175
surviving from age i to i + 1 is ζi, with ζ0 = 1 and ζT = 0. Thus, the mass176
of individuals alive at age i is µi = µ1
∏i
j=1 ζj−1.
9 All individuals must retire177
when i = M = 50. The other features of the economy are those of the standard178
RBC model featuring capital adjustment costs and variable utilization.179
7The data examined in Ohanian and Raffo (2012) is at quarterly frequencies. At the annual
frequency, the importance of the extensive margin to explain cyclical variations in total hours
is even more predominant. In the US the intensive margin accounts for only about 1/6 of the
fluctuations in aggregate hours (Heckman, 1984), and in the majority of OECD countries the
annual volatility of employment is at least twice that of hours.
8We thank the Associate Editor for suggesting to study this additional channel.
9The mass of newborns µ1 is chosen so that the total population
∑T
i=1 µi has unit size.
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3.1. Preferences and labor supply180
Preferences of an agent aged i are specified over consumption and total hours181
worked and take the form182
u (c, n; i) =
1
1− σ
(
c−
λin
1+1/ηi
1 + 1/ηi
)1−σ
, (1)
with σ > 0 and where c denotes consumption and n the total hours worked183
in the year.10 The preference parameters λi and ηi are age dependent and, in184
particular, ηi is the wage-elasticity of labor supply. As in Bils and Cho (1994)185
and Cho and Cooley (1994), for example, we distinguish between the number of186
hours worked per unit of time (say a week), denoted h ∈ [0, h ], and the number187
of weeks the individual works in the year, denoted e ∈ [0, e ]. Hence, total hours188
worked in a year are n = eh.189
Without loss of generality, we normalize the total “number of weeks” in the190
year, e , to unity and interpret e as the employment rate as in Cho and Cooley191
(1994). Preferences are specified over total hours worked in the year, but the192
mapping from hours worked per week and labor services per week is non-linear193
and workers face a choice between work-week length and the number of work194
weeks per year. For an individual aged i, the mapping from weekly hours worked195
to labor services per week obeys196
ℓi = g (h; i) , (2)
where the function g (h; i) has the following properties: for each age group i,197
g (h; i) is increasing in h; it is equal to zero at the origin; over the domain198
[0, 1], g (h, i) is first convex and then becomes concave. This captures two key199
features: first, that over some domain of hours, a part-time worker is often less200
productive than a full-time worker; second, that after some point working longer201
hours leads to fatigue and lower returns to work. The length of the optimally202
chosen workweek must satisfy the condition203
g
(
h¯i; i
)
h¯i
= g′
(
h¯i; i
)
, (3)
with the interpretation that the average productivity in the week is equal to the204
marginal productivity of an additional hour of work that week. Despite being205
endogenous, the optimal workweek length does not depend on wealth or the206
wage rate.207
10If σ = 1, the utility function specializes to u (c, n; i) = ln
(
c− λin
1+1/ηi
1+1/ηi
)
.
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Individuals maximize their life-time expected utility, given by208
Et
 T∑
i=1
βi−1
 i∏
j=1
ζj−1
u (ci,t+i−1, ni,t+i−1; i)
 , (4)
where ci,t ≥ 0 and ni,t ∈ (0, h× e).
11
209
3.2. Financial markets210
As in R´ıos-Rull (1996), markets are sequentially complete. In addition,211
two outside assets are traded: government bonds and shares in the stand-in212
firm.12 There are also actuarially fair contracts for annuities. These contracts213
are arrangements whereby all members of the same cohort sign a contract in214
which survivors share the assets (or debts) of the agents that die. Next period’s215
assets are the current savings divided by the probability of surviving. The216
resulting budget constraint faced by an individual aged i is217
(1 + τc) ci,t + ptsi+1,t+1 + dtbi+1,t+1 +
∑
z∈Z
qzt x
z
i+1,t+1
= (1− τh)wtg
(
h¯i; i
)
ei,t + ai,t + Lt,
(5)
where τc and τh are the consumption and labor income tax rates, x
z
i+1,t+1218
constitutes the amount of state-contingent Arrow securities for each event z ∈ Z,219
bought by individuals aged i, at price qzt ; bi+1,t+1 are the government bonds,220
bought at discount price dt; si+1,t+1 are the shares in the firm owned by an221
individual aged i, bought at the ex-dividend price pt. The taxable labor income222
of an individual aged i is wtg
(
h¯i; i
)
ei,t. Finally, the individual’s resources223
include lump-sum transfers received from the government Lt and her start of224
period wealth, given by225
ai,t =
(πt + pt) si,t + bi,t + xi,t
ζi−1
, (6)
where xi,t and bi,t are the payments from the Arrow securities and from the226
government bonds, and πt is the after-tax profits distributed to shareholders.227
3.3. Firms228
The production function of the representative firm is229
Yt = exp
(
ǫ1t
)
((ut/u¯)Kt)
α
H1−αt , (7)
11See the Appendix B.1 for a detailed derivation of the optimality conditions.
12The volume of outstanding equity shares is normalized to unity.
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where the capital services are the product of the stock of capital Kt and the230
rate of capital utilization, (ut/u¯), and where231
Ht ≡
M∑
i=1
µig
(
h¯i; i
)
eit, (8)
are the efficiency units of labor services. Shocks to productivity, ǫ1t , follow an232
exogenous Markov process. Raising the capital utilization rate is costly because233
it implies a faster capital depreciation; the depreciation function is234
δ (ut) = δ0 + δ1 (ut/u¯)
1+ς
, (9)
with ς > 0 and δ¯ ≡ δ0 + δ1 ∈ (0, 1) the steady state depreciation rate. The firm235
faces adjustment costs in investment, so that236
Kt+1 −Kt = Φ(It/Kt)Kt − δ (ut)Kt. (10)
with Φ ( • ) increasing and concave. The representative firm maximizes13237
J
(
Kt; ǫ
1
t
)
= max
It,Ht
{
πt + Et
[
Λt+1J
(
Kt+1; ǫ
1
t+1
) ]}
, (11)
subject to (10), and where Λt+1 is the stochastic discount factor of the firm’s238
shareholders, and after-tax profits, πt, are given by239
πt = (1− τk)
[
exp
(
ǫ1t
)
Kαt H
1−α
t − wtHt − It
]
. (12)
3.4. Government240
The government taxes capital income, labor income and consumption, at the241
rates τk, τh and τc, respectively. It spends Gt as government consumption and242
provides lump-sum transfers, Lt. The government budget constraint is243
dtBt+1 = Gt + Lt +Bt − τk (Yt − wtHt − It)− τhwtHt − τcCt. (13)
The dynamics of Lt and Gt are described by the following two equations244
L̂t = −ϕLB̂t, (14)
G˜t = ρGG˜t−1 − ϕGB̂t + σgǫ
2
t , (15)
where ǫ2t is an exogenous shock; L̂t ≡
(
Lt − L¯
)
/Y¯ and B̂t ≡
(
Bt − B¯
)
/Y¯245
are lump-sum transfers and debt in deviation from steady state as percentage246
of the steady state output; G˜t is government spending in log-deviation from247
steady state; the parameters ϕL, ρG and ϕG are positive, consistent with the248
13The optimality condition solving the firm’s problem are in Appendix B.2.
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transversality condition of the government sector249
Et
[
lim
z→∞
(Πzi=tdi)Bz+1
]
= 0. (16)
3.5. Equilibrium and solution method250
We consider the model’s competitive equilibrium, carefully defined in the Ap-251
pendix B.3. As in R´ıos-Rull (1996), the computation of equilibrium is based252
on linear decision rules. Following standard steps, the firm’s and the individ-253
ual optimality conditions, and the market clearing conditions are log-linearized254
around steady state. A detailed derivation of the equilibrium conditions is col-255
lected in the Appendix B.4, while Appendix B.5 includes a detailed description256
of the algorithm to find the steady state equilibrium. The log-linear model is257
described in Appendix B.6.258
4. Government size and aggregate labor supply elasticity259
This Section, first characterizes the differences in employment volatility260
across demographic groups. Second, we ask how the employment share of each261
group varies as the size of the government is changed. Third, we show the262
relation between the aggregate labor supply elasticity and taxation.263
4.1. Cyclical properties of hours over the life-cycle264
The optimality condition for the choice of total hours and workweek length265
for an individual aged i = 1, . . . ,M , is266
ni,t =
[(
1− τh
1 + τc
)
g (hi,t; i)h
−1
i,t wt
λi
]ηi
, (17)
and267
g (hi,t; i)
hi,t
= g′ (hi,t; i) . (18)
From (18), hi,t = h¯i, so that the workweek length is acyclical and all the cyclical268
fluctuations in total hours occur in the extensive margin. The result that follows269
compares total hours volatility across demographic groups.270
Lemma 1. Denote by σi the standard deviation of the logarithm of total hours271
worked by individuals aged i and σw the standard deviation of the logarithm of272
the wage rate. It follows that273
σi = ηiσw, (19)
where ηi is the Frisch labor supply elasticity of individuals aged i.274
Lemma 1 follows immediately from equation (17). The upshot is that the de-275
mographic groups with large labor supply elasticities display more volatile em-276
ployment rates (and, hence, total hours worked) over the business cycle.277
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4.2. Steady state: taxation and labor force composition278
Let the employment rates of individuals aged i in two countries with different279
fiscal profiles be denoted e¯i and e¯
′
i, and the employment rates for a different280
demographic group j in the same two countries be e¯j and e¯
′
j . Then281
ln
(
e¯i/e¯
′
i
)
ln
(
e¯j/e¯′j
) = ηi
ηj
(20)
This result is summarized in the following lemma (proven in Appendix C).282
Lemma 2. Consider the steady state of two economies with different fiscal283
policy profiles. The relative percentage difference in employment rates in the284
two countries for individuals aged i and individuals aged j, is given by (ηi/ηj).285
The upshot is that an increase in tax rates changes the composition of the286
aggregate labor supply towards the less volatile individuals.287
4.3. The aggregate labor supply elasticity288
The third result we obtain is about the relationship between the aggregate289
labor supply elasticity and taxes. We establish the Proposition that follows.290
Proposition 1. Around steady state the aggregate labor supply elasticity is291
d lnHt
d lnwt
≡ En =
M∑
i=1
s¯hiηi, (21)
where s¯hi ≡ µig
(
h¯i; i
)
e¯i/H¯ is the share of efficient units of labor supplied by292
individuals aged i in steady state. Moreover,293
dEn
dτj
=
גj
τj
ση, ∀j = {h, k, c}, (22)
where ση ≡
∑M
i=1 s¯hiη
2
i − (
∑M
i=1 s¯hiηi)
2 is the cross-sectional variance of the294
labor supply elasticities, and295
גj =

d ln w¯
d ln τh
− τh1−τh if j = h,
d ln w¯
d ln τc
− τc1+τc if j = c and
d ln w¯
d ln τk
if j = k.
(23)
Thus, the sensitivity of the aggregate labor supply elasticity to changes in tax296
rates is increasing in the dispersion of the elasticities ηi across age groups.297
The proof of Proposition 1 is in Appendix D.298
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5. Quantitative evaluation299
In what follows, we study the quantitative importance of our mechanism to300
generate a negative correlation between government size and aggregate volatil-301
ity. Our strategy is the following. We first calibrate our model to the US, in302
Section 5.1. In Section 5.2, we evaluate the model’s fit by looking at how it303
matches some moments of the US economy that are not used as calibration tar-304
gets. Finally, in Section 5.3, we let the fiscal profile of the calibrated economy305
vary in the same way that it varies across the OECD countries, and evaluate306
the implications of these changes for business cycle volatility. Based on this ex-307
ercise, we study if our mechanism is quantitatively important by comparing the308
strength of the relationship between government size and aggregate volatility309
implied by the model and in the data.310
5.1. Calibration311
We calibrate the baseline economy to the US. The calibration makes use of312
three types of data: i) the NIPA tables, ii) the US fiscal policy parameters, and313
iii) life-cycle earnings, employment and hours data. We first describe the targets314
determining the technology and the preference parameters that are stable over315
the life-cycle,
(
α, β, δ¯, ς, φ, σ, ρ, σǫ1
)
. Next, we explain how the parameters of the316
government sector are set, (τk, τc, τh, ϕL, ρG, ϕG, σg, g¯y). Finally, we describe the317
targets determining the preference parameters that change over the life-cycle.318
The preference parameters that change over the life-cycle include those of319
the function g (h; i) and the parameters λi, for i = 1, . . . , 50, that determine320
the life-cycle profile of earnings and hours worked by those in employment,321
and the labor supply elasticities, ηi, for i = 1, . . . , 50. The main target we322
use to calibrate these elasticities is the relative volatility of employment of the323
young. This target allows us to pin down η1 for a given list of relative elsticities324
(ηi/η1), for i = 2, . . . , 15 and (ηi/η40), for i = 41, . . . , 50. In turn, as explained in325
Section 5.1.4, we pin down these relative elasticities by making use of Lemma 2326
and data on employment over the life-cycle in a second country with a different327
fiscal profile from the US. This allows us to match the effect that changing the328
tax profile exerts on the relative demographic composition of the workforce.329
5.1.1. Technology and stable preference parameters330
The calibration of the technology and preference parameters that are stable331
over the life-cycle follows standard practices. The capital income share α is set332
to 0.283 based on the NIPA. The discount factor β is set to 0.992, to match an333
investment-output ratio of 14% (NIPA). The steady state annual depreciation334
rate δ¯ is set to 0.05, as in Cooley and Prescott (1995). The elasticity of marginal335
depreciation with respect to utilization is set to ς = 0.560, as in Burnside and336
Eichenbaum (1996). Based on Basu and Kimball (1997) φ, the elasticity of the337
investment-capital ratio to Tobin’s Q, is set to 2.5. The inverse elasticity of338
intertemporal substitution σ is set equal to 2, as in Greenwood et al. (1988).339
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Finally, based on an estimated AR(1) model for the Solow residuals (see Ap-340
pendix G for details), we set ρ = 0.847, while restricting σǫ1 = 0.016 to match341
the volatility of US output.342
5.1.2. Government sector343
We choose values for the tax rates on capital income, labor income and con-344
sumption based on evidence in Carey and Rabesona (2002), who have produced345
series for average effective tax rates in the OECD based on the methodology346
of Mendoza et al. (1994). The tax rates for the US are: τk = 0.3712, τc = 0.0526347
and τh = 0.2567. We set values for the parameters ϕL, ρG, ϕG and σg, based348
on an estimated VAR model of government spending and public debt (see Ap-349
pendix F for details). This gives: ρG = 0.913, ϕG = 0.110, ϕL = 0.180 and350
σǫ2 = 0.015. Finally, using data from the BEA, the steady state ratio of gov-351
ernment consumption to GDP, g¯y, is calculated to be 22%, which corresponds352
to the average share of government spending in output over the period 1970 –353
2009.354
5.1.3. Parameterization of g (•) and λi355
We calibrate the g (•) function to match the life-cycle profile of earnings and356
hours by those in employment. We assume the following form for g (•)357
g (h; i) ≡
1
1 + κih
−̺i
, (24)
where κi > 0 and ̺i > 1 are age-specific parameters. From condition (3), the358
optimal number of hours by those in employment is359
h¯i =
[
κi (̺i − 1)
]1/̺i
. (25)
Using (25) to substitute in (24), we obtain g
(
h¯i; i
)
= 1− 1/̺i. Thus, the labor360
services produced per week are dependent only on ̺i, and we set their values361
to match earnings over the life-cycle obtained from the PSID. We set κi to362
match the life-cycle profile of hours worked by those in employment, obtained363
from Blundell et al. (2013).14 We set λi to match the employment rates over364
the life-cycle in the US (Blundell et al., 2013) and, hence, match both hours365
and employment over the life-cycle, as shown in Figure 2.366
[Figure 2 about here]367
5.1.4. Calibration of the labor supply elasticities368
We now describe the aspects of the calibration that have to do with the labor369
supply elasticity parameters, ηi. Prime aged workers (aged 30 to 54) all have the370
same labor supply elasticity ηi = η prime age = 0.20 for all i = 16 . . . 40, based on371
the meta-analysis of quasi-experimental studies by Chetty et al. (2012). This372
14We thank Antoine Bozio for kindly providing us with their data.
13
leaves the parameters η1 . . . η15, and η41 . . . η50, still to be determined. They373
are set to match two targets: the relative employment volatility of the young374
(aged 15 to 29), and the relative life-cycle profile of employment in the US and375
a second country with a different fiscal profile. The first target determines η1376
given the ratios (ηi/η1), for i = 2 . . . 15, and (ηi/η40), for i = 41 . . . 50. In turn,377
these ratios are pinned down using the second target, based on Lemma 2. The378
second country is chosen to be France because the data from Blundell et al.379
(2013) is only for the US, UK and France and the latter has a tax profile that380
contrasts more with the US than that of the UK.381
The details are as follows. Let σn15−29 denote the standard deviation of total382
hours (in logs) worked by the young, and σn30−64 that of those aged 30 to 64.383
Given η prime age = 0.20, we show in Appendix E that384
η1
15∑
i=1
µin¯i (ηi/η1)
N¯15−29
= 0.20
[
N¯30−54
N¯30−64
+
50∑
i=41
µin¯i (ηi/η40)
N¯30−64
]
σn15−29
σn30−64
, (26)
where N¯15−29 =
∑15
i=1 µin¯i and N¯30−64 =
∑50
i=16 µin¯i. In the above equation,385
the parameters µi (the population of individuals aged i) are obtained from the386
OECD population statistics.387
Thus, we solve for the η1 matching the relative volatility of employment of388
the young,
(
σn15−29/σ
n
30−64
)
. But, to do this we need values for the ratios (ηi/η1),389
for i = 2 . . . 15, and (ηi/η40), for i = 41 . . . 50, obtained based on Lemma 2, as390
follows391
ηi
η1
=
ln
(
e¯USi /e¯
FR
i
)
ln
(
e¯US1 /e¯
FR
1
) , and ηi
η40
=
ln
(
e¯USi /e¯
FR
i
)
ln
(
e¯US40 /e¯
FR
40
) . (27)
Notice that, while we use data from a second country in (27) we do not target392
employment levels in France. Only if the model is exactly correct and taxes are393
the only explanation for differences in employment rates across countries, would394
we match employment in France exactly.15395
[Figure 3 about here]396
Figure 3 contrasts employment in the US and France from the model and the397
data. The fact that we match quite well France’s employment is an encouraging398
measure of the model’s fit. This result is also consistent with the findings399
in Chetty et al. (2012), who show that estimates of steady state elasticities of400
the response of employment to taxes are similar whether one relies on macro or401
micro data, although they differ when one estimates intertemporal substitution402
elasticities based on short-run fluctuations.403
15For example, the calibration strategy implies that although we match exactly the ratio
ln
(
e¯US39 /e¯
FR
39
)
/ ln
(
e¯US1 /e¯
FR
1
)
,
we may underestimate both eFR39 and e
FR
1 .
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The life-cycle profile of labor supply elasticities is shown in Figure 4. For404
all prime aged individuals, aged 30 to 54, the labor supply elasticity is set at405
0.2. Instead, for young and old individuals, the elasticities are allowed to vary,406
reaching a maximum of around 8.22.16 The implied aggregate labor supply407
elasticity, En, is 0.84. This is remarkably close to 0.86, the macro elasticity408
recommended by Chetty et al. (2012). Thus, heterogeneity in labor supply409
elasticities helps reconcile micro-econometric evidence and macro models.410
[Figure 4 about here]411
Table 3 summarizes the baseline calibration and corresponding targets.412
[Table 3 about here]413
5.2. Properties of the baseline economy414
We now study the behavior of the model under the baseline calibration. In415
particular, we look at the implications of our calibration for aggregate business416
cycle statistics and for relative employment volatilities of different demographic417
groups, not used as targets in the calibration.418
5.2.1. Aggregate business cycle statistics419
Panel A of Table 4, compares aggregate business cycle moments under the420
baseline calibration to the US business cycle statistics. The table shows the421
properties of output, consumption, investment, government spending and total422
hours worked in both the data and the model.423
[Table 4 about here]424
The baseline model matches the volatility of aggregate variables at least425
as well as the standard RBC model. Consumption and investment volatility426
are similar to their empirical counterparts. The model suffers from the same427
drawback as the standard RBC model: the volatility of total hours is about half428
that of output, while the empirical counterpart is 90%. But, this is achieved with429
a low labor supply elasticity for the prime aged population. So the fact that430
it performs at least as well as the standard RBC model (typically calibrated431
with an elasticity around 1) is significant. Also, since fluctuations in total432
hours occur only through employment it is better to look at the volatility of433
employment in the data. The model accounts for 75% of employment volatility.434
The high correlations between output and the private components of aggregate435
expenditure are the result of the model’s RBC structure.436
16The large elasticities for the young and the old are consistent with the evidence that is
reviewed in Keane and Rogerson (2012) for some demographic groups.
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5.2.2. Employment fluctuations by age group437
One of our calibration targets was the volatility of the young relative to that438
of those aged 30 to 64. This relative volatility is equal to 2.20 and is exactly439
matched by the model. But, to judge the fit of the model, it is useful to look at440
moments not used as targets for the calibration. Panel B of Table 4 looks at the441
model’s ability to match the volatility of employment for specific age groups,442
the young (15 to 29), the prime aged (30 to 44) and the old (54 to 64), in levels443
and relative to the total hours volatility. None of these moments is used as a444
target in the calibration.445
The model matches very well the relative volatility of the young (1.57 in the446
data and 1.64 in the model), and also that of individuals aged 30 to 64 (0.70447
versus 0.74). However, it produces a relative volatility for the prime aged that448
is too low compared to the data (0.75 versus 0.20) and, as a consequence, a449
relative volatility for those aged 55 to 64 that is too high. This follows from the450
low labor supply elasticity attributed to this group.17451
5.3. Government size and automatic stabilizers452
Next, we solve the model under alternative fiscal policy parameters, with453
each combination mimicking the fiscal profile of an OECD country, based on454
the estimates by Carey and Rabesona (2002), and the observed government455
spending to GDP ratios. In turn, for each OECD country, we calculate the456
model implied government size and the corresponding business cycle volatility457
measures.458
Figure 5 shows that the link between government size, the demographic com-459
position of the workforce and volatility is qualitatively consistent with the facts460
documented in Section 2. Higher taxes imply a low volatile-worker employment461
share. The smaller the employment share of volatile workers, the lower the462
volatility of aggregate hours worked and output.463
[Figure 5 about here]464
Table 5 reports the estimates from a OLS regression between aggregate465
volatility and government size using the empirical OECD data, and compared466
to the same regression coefficients implied by the model. This exercise allows467
us to interpret our results from a quantitative perspective.468
[Table 5 about here]469
Our baseline calibration implies a slope coefficient in the regression of output470
volatility on government size that is 75% of its empirical counterpart. The slope471
associated with the regression of hours volatility on government size corresponds472
to 114% of its empirical counterpart. Thus, the model is able to reproduce473
almost exactly the automatic stabilizers’ strength.18474
17In Appendix I, we consider an alternative calibration of the labor supply elasticities that
overcomes this problem by attributing a larger elasticity to prime aged workers.
18In Appendix I we show that once we introduce exogenous demographic changes in the
16
6. Conclusion475
Two empirical facts serve as motivation for this paper. The first is the strong476
negative correlation between government size and the volatility of business cy-477
cles across OECD countries. The second fact, is the substantial heterogeneity478
across demographic groups in terms of the cyclical volatility of employment. We479
develop a heterogeneous agent OLG model quantitatively consistent with these480
empirical facts. Our results suggest that differences over the life-cycle in labor481
supply behavior help explain salient business cycle features and, in particular,482
automatic stabilizers.483
Appendix. Supplementary material484
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Figure 1: volatility of employment by demographic group (OECD)
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Note: The data is annual and the source is the OECD Labour Force Statistics.
All variables are reported in logs as deviations from an HP trend with smoothing
parameter 6.25. The volatility is expressed relative to the 40 – 49 age group.
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Figure 2: Calibration targets: employment and hours over the life-cycle
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Note: the data source is Blundell, Bozio, and Laroque (2013).
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Figure 3: Model evaluation: employment rates in two countries (model/data)
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Note: the data source is Blundell, Bozio, and Laroque (2013). US employment is a calibration
target while France’s employment is not.
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Figure 4: Calibrated parameters: labor supply elasticity over the life-cycle
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Note: values for ηi for i = 1, . . . , 50, corresponding to workers aged between 15 and 64.
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Figure 5: Quantitative results: government size and volatility (model)
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Note: Volatility of output and hours from the model are the standard deviation of the HP
filtered output and hours implied by the model. Each observation corresponds to an economy
whose fiscal policy parameters are chosen to mimic the fiscal profile of a specific OECD
economy.
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Table 1: government size and demographic structure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
vol. share vol. share young share young share
Gov. Size −20.180∗∗∗ −16.250∗∗∗ −20.145∗∗∗ −16.217∗∗∗
(5.226) (5.256) (5.232) (5.263)
Share of 60+ in pop. −20.584∗∗ −20.576∗∗
(8.009) (8.019)
Obs. 75 75 75 75
R2 0.472 0.518 0.471 0.517
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: Each observation corresponds to a country and one of the following time periods: 1970 – 1979,
1980 – 1989, 1990 – 1999, and 2000 – 2009. Time dummies are included but not listed. The volatile
share corresponds to the share of employment of the population aged 15 to 29 and 60 to 64 in the
total employment of the population aged 15 to 64. The young share corresponds to the share of
employment of the population aged 15 to 29 in the total employment of the population aged 15 to
64. Gov size is the ratio between total tax revenue and GDP. Share of 60+ in pop. is the share of
individuals aged 60 or more in the population. See Appendix A for details about the data.
25
Table 2: government size, demographic structure and aggregate volatility
vol. hours vol. GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gov. Size −1.819∗∗ −0.868 −1.909∗∗ −1.275
(0.794) (0.848) (0.768) (0.841)
Vol. Share 0.056∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗
(0.016) (0.018) (0.017)
Vol. Hours 0.713∗∗∗
(0.078)
% Change
Fiscal Coef. −52% −33%
Obs. 75 77 75 77 77 75
R2 0.169 0.099 0.182 0.565 0.134 0.180
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: Each observation corresponds to a country and one of the following time periods: 1970 – 1979,
1980 – 1989, 1990 – 1999, and 2000 – 2009. Time dummies are included but not listed. Volatility
of output and volatility of hours are the standard deviation of the respective cyclical component
(calculated using the HP filter with smoothing parameter 6.25). The Vol. Share corresponds to the
share of employment of the population aged 15 to 29 and 60 to 64 in the total employment of the
population aged 15 to 64. Gov. Size is the ratio between total tax revenue and GDP. See Appendix
A for details about the data.
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Table 3: baseline calibration (summary)
parameter target/source
stable parameters
α 0.283 Targets capital income share
β 0.992 Targets investment/GDP ratio of 14%
ρ 0.847 Targets Solow residuals autocorrelation
σǫ1 0.016 Targets US output volatility
ρG 0.919 Target: VAR estimation
σǫ2 0.015 Target: VAR estimation, standard deviation of residuals
ϕG 0.110 Target: VAR estimation
ϕL 0.180 Target: VAR estimation
g¯y 0.220 Targets government spending as fraction of GDP of 22%
δ¯ 0.050 Source: Cooley and Prescott (1995)
φ 2.500 Source: Basu and Kimball (1997)
ς 0.560 Source: Burnside and Eichenbaum (1996)
σ 2.000 Source: Greenwood et al. (1988)
τh 0.256 Source: Carey and Rabesona (2002)
τk 0.371 Source: Carey and Rabesona (2002)
τc 0.053 Source: Carey and Rabesona (2002)
life-cycle parameters
̺i i=1,. . . ,50 Target weakly earnings (PSID)
κi i=1,. . . ,50 Target hours worked by employed (Blundell et al., 2013)
λi i=1,. . . ,50 Target life-cycle employment rates, US (Blundell et al., 2013)
µi i=1,. . . ,70 Target OECD population statistics, US
η1 6.834 Target relative volatility of workers aged 15 – 29, US{
ηi/η1, i = 2 . . . 15
ηi/η40, i = 41 . . . 50
Target rel. emp. rates, US & FR (Blundell et al., 2013)
η prime age 0.200 Source: Chetty et al. (2012)
Note: target/source indicates either the target used to obtain the parameter or the source
informing the choice of parameter value. See Appendix A for details about the data. See
Figure 4, which displays the calibrated values of each Frisch elasticity.
27
Table 4: Model evaluation: US business cycle statistics (model and data)
PANEL A (aggregate vol.)
std. dev. correlation
variable data model data model
output 1.45 1.45 1.00 1.00
consumption 1.20 1.42 0.90 0.99
investment 5.13 4.00 0.94 0.98
government spending 0.93 0.96 -0.13 0.02
total hours 1.28 0.78 0.92 1.00
employment rate 15 – 64 1.04 0.78 0.89 1.00
PANEL B (emp. vol. by group)
age group std.dev
std. dev.
relative to 15 – 64
data model data model
15 – 29 1.63 1.27 1.57 1.64
30 – 54 0.78 0.16 0.75 0.20
55 – 64 0.70 2.73 0.66 3.52
30 – 64 0.74 0.58 0.70 0.74
Note: data on GDP, consumption, investment and government spending is from the NIPA
tables. Inventories are excluded from the measure of investment. Data on hours worked is
from the Conference Board Total Economy Database. Employment rate 15 – 64 is from the
OECD and corresponds to the employment/population ratio among the individuals aged 15 to
64. Cyclical component is the log in deviations from an HP trend with smoothing parameter
6.25. The model’s reported statistics are calculated under the US fiscal profile. See Appendix
A for details about the data.
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Table 5: Quantitative results: volatility and government size (model/data)
σ = β0 + β1 (tax rate) data model
(
βmodel1 /β
data
1
)
std (Y ) β1 −1.909 −1.428 75%
std (H) β1 −1.819 −2.074 114%
Note: OLS regressions where the dependent variables are, respectively, output volatility,
std (Y ), and aggregate hours volatility, std (Y ), and the explanatory variable is the tax rev-
enue to output ratio. The volatility of output and hours is the standard deviation of the series
in log deviations from an HP trend with smoothing parameter 6.25. The tax rates used to
calibrate the fiscal profile of each economy in the simulations are from Carey and Rabesona
(2002). For the empirical regressions, each observation corresponds to a country and one of
the following time periods: 1970 – 1979, 1980 – 1989, 1990 – 1999, and 2000 – 2009. Time
dummies are included but not listed.
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